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REPORT TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE PARTY GROUP ON EAST TIMOR

BY

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Introduction.

In July 1987 I was on a private journey in Indonesia, showing my son my country of birth, during which trip I had an informal meeting with Soepardjo Roestam, Minister of Domestic Affairs. We touched the subject of East Timor and reacting on my various questions Soepardjo suggested to have a look for myself over there. Once in Indonesia I would be his personal guest, free to go where, and speak with whom I wanted.

Back in Europe, the Presidium of my group in principle authorised me to go. By chance, at the very last moment, a place fell free in the official EP - Delegation heading for the AIPO meeting at the end of January/beginning of February 1988 in Kuala Lumpur. From there to Jakarta is of course only a short trip, so I could accept rather unexpectedly Soepardjo's invitation.

This report is based on lecture of material from Indonesian officials, Amnesty International and Justitia et Pax documents, reports from parliamentary delegations, articles from visiting journalists, meetings with Indonesian officials, including Timorese ones, contacts with Portuguese colleagues and a personal visit to East Timor including direct contact with authentic Timorese of the younger generation who speak Bahasa Indonesia, and a helicopter flight across the whole country, even over the area where Fretilin still claims to be present, including an unscheduled stop there.

List of persons who received me with regard to my visit to Indonesia - January 28 till February 1, 1988.

I. **In Brussels**
   1. The Ambassador : Mr. Atmono Suryo
   2. Political counsellors : Mr. IGNK Sumantera
      Mr. Pitono Purnomo

II. **Kuala Lumpur**
   1. Speaker of the House of Representatives : Mr. Kharis Suhud
   2. Vice-Speaker of the House of Representatives : Mr. Syaiful Sulun

   and other Indonesian MP's

III. **In Jakarta**
   1. Minister of Interior : Mr. Soepardjo Roestam

2. Chairman of BP-7 : Mr. Oetoyo Usman, accompanied by two vice-chairmen, a.o. Prof. Dr Padmo Wahyono

3. Minister of Transmigration : Mr.Martono,accompanied by two assistants, a.o Mr. Soedjiwo HS

4. Chief of General Staff Indonesian Armed Forces : Rear-Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo accompanied by two assistants first admirals

5. Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces : General Try Sutrisno, (successor of General Benny Moerdani as Commander of the Armed Forces)

6. Director General of Law and Legislation, Department of Justice : Mr.Harsono Adisumarto, accompanied by Director General for Imigration, Mr.Soelarso and

Director,Institute for Socialization and Correction,Mr.Soedarwo

7. Guest for Lunch :
   a. Minister of Interior.
   b. Secretary General of Department of Interior, : Mr. Aswismarmo.
   c. Director General for Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, : Mr. Nana S Sutresna (regret).
   d. Chairman of BP-7
   e. Director for International Treaties, Department of Foreign Affairs, : Mr.Nugroho Wisnoemurti.

IV. In Bali
1. Governor : Prof. Dr Ida Bagus Mantra.

V. In the Province of East Timor
1. Governor : Mr. Mario V Carrascalao
2. Commandant of the Regiment : Colonel Mohammad Ma'ruf
3. Chairman of DPP-PDI : Mr. Soerjadi, Vice-Speaker of the House and his delegation, including the daughter of Sukarno, who is MP,

visiting East Timor.

4. Deputy Head of Delegation International Committee of the Red Cross. : Mr. Oliver Chave,
5. Chiefs of :
   a. Provincial Development Bodies.
   b. Provincial Health Service.
   c. Provincial Education and Culture.
   d. Provincial Agriculture.
   e. Village Development.
   f. Provincial Transmigration.
   g. District, Baucau.
   h. District, Viqueque.
   i. Sub-District, Cairui.
   j. Village of Cairui.
6. Schoolchildren, people in the street and on the market.

RESUME

1. Historically, the case of East Timor is a delayed aftermath of the struggle for colonial domination in the 17th century in the Indonesian Archipelago between the Portugese and the Dutch. The Portuguese were the pioneers in exploring in their small ships the areas all over the world, and also in the Indonesian waters. In 1520 they arrived in Timor. After them arrived the Dutch (de Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie) who succeeded to get the Portuguese out of Java, Celebes, the Moluccans. They withdrew to the small Sunda Islands, Flores, Solor and Timor. After occupying Flores and Solor the Dutch landed in Kupang (West Timor) in 1651 and conquered the actual territory of West Timor. Had the Dutch pushed on and had they occupied the whole island, East Timor would never have been a problem, because it would have been included in the transfer of sovereignty of 1949. The real pacification of East Timor happened only in 1919. From 1927 Portugal (Salazar) used East Timor as a place of exile for political opponents. It took the Portuguese a long time to recognise de jure of the situation. The Dutch occupied Flores, Solor and West Timor 1651, but only in 1859 the Portuguese accepted de jure of the situation by recognising the Dutch sovereignty over Flores, Solor and West Timor.

2. After 4 years of fighting following the Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the Dutch recognised the Republic of Indonesia as well as the sovereignty of the new republic on December 27, 1949. That would in due course lead to a new era of respect and mutual friendship between the two peoples who had already for centuries close relations.

3. Influenced by this decolonization of their big neighbour , the East Timor people rose up against their Portuguese ruler in 1949,but the Portuguese crashed the revolt like they had done before in 1910 after the Republic of Portugal was proclaimed. Where big Indonesia succeeded in its fight for freedom, small East Timor failed.

4. In 1951 the Portuguese constitution was changed so as to consider their colonies as overseas parts of Portugal. Consequently Portugal refused to account for East Timor etc. Before the UN Commission on Decolonization, Indonesia voted against Salazar on the decolonization issues, who broke off diplomatic relations.

5. On April 25,1974, a military coup took place in Portugal and on May 26,1974,the regime Salazar/Caetano disappeared. The next day the representative of Portugal in the UN declared officially that Portugal accepted self-determination for all its former colonies,namely Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bisau, Cape Verde, East Timor and Macao, etc.

6. As an immediate result of the new approach, the colonial government in Dili for the first time allowed and even promoted the forming of political parties, which were until then strictly forbidden.The following five parties were formed :
   a. Fretilin, demanding immediate independence.
   b. UDT, wanting federation with Portugal.
   c. Apodeti, asking for integration with Indonesia, and two smaller ones, Kota and Trabalista, who started to fight among themselves, sometimes violently.

7. As off August 1974,real fighting started between various groups, which got more and more the characteristics of civil war, which really broke out on August 11, 1975.

8. The colonial authorities were unable or unwilling to interfere to stop the fighting and restore the law and order.
   On the contrary, on the night of August 26, 1975, the governor Lemos Pires fled on the head of its soldiers by boat to the nearby island of Atauro,which they evacuated a few weeks later. So ended 450 years of colonial rule in an unorderly way without the normal transfer of sovereignty based on a formal agreement between the former colonial power and the new regime in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions 1514 XV and 1541 XV, which leave open the option between complete independence, some form of federation with the former colonial power or integration with another state. Each of these options was preferred by one of the parties of East Timor, but Portugal failed to consult the people about their preference and fled instead.

9. When fleeing, the governor who had already patronised Fretilin before, shook off every appearence of objectivity by handing over all the weapons to one party only, Fretilin. One should remember that at that particular time part of the Portuguese military sympathised with marxism. President Spinola had surrendered his seat to President Da Costa Gomes, a move welcomed by the Partido Comunista Portuges. This of course did not end the already raging civil war, but gave Fretilin a clear and unfair advantage.

10. In the meantime Indonesia expressed on various occasions that it had no territorial ambition/claim with regard to East Timor. Its constitution referred expressis verbis to the territory of the former "Nederlandsch Oost-Indie". In constant negotiation with Portugal it tried to find a proper solution. One of the steps for example to find a solution was that Portugal and Indonesia agreed to organise an all-party meeting in Macao from the 26th until the 29th of June, 1975. The UDT and Apodeti appeared in Macao with Kota and Trabalista, but Fretilin refused to take part in accordance with the habitual marxist pretense that they, and they alone represent "the people".

11. On November 28, 1975, Fretilin declared unilaterally the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. UDT, realising that federation with Portugal was no longer feasible, proclaimed immediately in Balibo together with Apodeti, Kota and Trabalista independence and simultaneous integration of the territory with Indonesia. In September 1975 they sent a petition to this end to Indonesia.

12. In December 1975 Indonesian volunteer forces entered East Timor in response to the request of the 4 political parties above, and started to put an end to the civil war. Since the nominal Colonial Administrator had abandonned the territory and did not exercise power any more, Indonesia appointed a delegation to investigate a petition dated May 31, 1976, of the House of Representatives of East Timor, urging the Indonesian Government to legalise integration. In June 1976 the delegation consulted local chiefs and council meetings of the inhabitants. On July 2, 1976, the delegation reported to the President that in their view it was the wish of the East Timorese to be united with Indonesia. Indonesia passed a law and on July 19, 1976, East Timor became its 27th province.

13. On the international front the following happened :
The Security Council of the UN discussed the matter twice, in December 1975 and in April 1976. After that no more. The UN General Assembly discussed the East Timor

question from 1975 till 1982. In 1975 there were 72 votes against and 10 votes pro Indonesia, with 43 abstaining. In 1982 there were 50 votes against and 48 votes pro Indonesia, with 43 abstaining. After that year the debate on East Timor was postponed each year until now. The UN Human Rights Commission decided in 1985 to dismiss the matter of East Timor from its agenda. The Non-Aligned Movement has removed East Timor from its documents since the Ministerial Level Coference in New Delhi in 1981.
In the Inter-Parliamentary Union the item has been deleted from all IPU's agendas and resolutions since 1983. The European Parliament deleted Indonesia in 1983 from its reports, but adopted in 1986 a resolution against Indonesia.

14. The second important neighbour state Australia has from the beginning expressed the view that there was no room for an independent state East Timor. The first who publicly stated this was the Labour Prime Minister Whitlam in September 1974. From 1978 Australia voted in favour of Indonesia in the UN, because its government accepted East Timor as a part of Indonesia may be the possibility of a Soviet airforce and naval base near Austalia's north coast, half an hour's flight from Darwin, and of Cuban soldiers in Dili dit not look attractive. New Zealand voted from 1979 always in favour of Indonesia.

15. Now, almost 12 years later, the situation can be described as follows :

    a. the Indonesian authorities, central, provincial and local, exercise full power in the territory,

    b. the governor, Ir Marrio Viegas Carrascalao and many civil servants are East Timorese,

    c. the Central Government has substantially invested money, expertise and man-power to improve the situation of the population with regard to public health, education, housing, infrastructure and agriculture,

    d. there is no security problem any more. The last military operation was in 1984. Since then the army stopped hot pursuit and mopping up operations, and Fretilin's presence is limited to small groups moving in a mountainous area. In fact, the Indonesian Government had offered twice general amnesty to Fretilin who are still in a mountainous area to join their brothers to develop East Timor, but they rejected to do so. There is now for example 5 times a day a bus between Dili in the north and Viqueque in

the south without any risk of landmines, the preferred weapon of guerrileros,

e. the international Red Cross has free access to prisons where the East Timorese prisoners are held, can submit complaints to the Department of Justice and check the results,

f. the Roman Catholic religion expanded vastly, profiting from the freedom of religion of the Panca Sila, the constitutional ideology. The churches are overcrowded, new ones and cathedral are being constructed. Priests enjoy free movement and are conducting their religious missions, can also serve the mass in Portuguese,

g. the population totals ± 600.000, 12 languages are spoken which can be subdivided in 35 dialects, but more and more one can communicate in Bahasa Indonesia. The illitaracy will disappear within a generation.

h. church organizations, especially Roman Catholic ones, are doing good work in their pastoral and spiritual care of the people. There are priests of many nationalities, and many of them master local languages.

16. During my stay in East Timor I had no security escort. I could go wherever I wanted and speak alone with whoever I wanted. The helicopter flight took me from Dili to Viqueque, Uato Karabau (unscheduled), Lospalos, Baukau, and Cai-Rui, so all over the island. Monseigneur Bello was unfortunately in Rome, but Ihad a long conversation with Governor Carrascalao, who has an East Timorese mother and a Portuguese father. In overcrowded churches Don Bosco's death 100 years ago was commemorated on January 31st in Bahasa Indonesia, various local languages and even Portuguese.

Conclusions

1. The actual situation seems to be irreversible. That leads to the recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over its 27th province on one hand.

2. Portugal claims on the other hand that the people of its former colony have not been properly consulted. This might or might not be the case, but one can hardly blame Indonesia for that since the responsible authorities for that consultation simply deserted on August 26, 1975, thereby ending defacto its control.

3. One should on the other hand appreciate Portugal's difficulties. Its constitution makes it difficult for the government to take a flexible attitude. Moreover, it is unfair to blame the nowadays government for what happened in the tumultuous period 1974/1976. After all, those events lead to the return of democracy and consequently to membership of the EEC. Indeed, Portugal did not switch from a paternalistic otocracy to a communist one. Furthermore, there is a deeprooted sense of togetherness with the East Timorese, and a justified pride on its pioneer role as discoverer of far away areas.

4. The controversial matter is in fact the question whether the Balibo proclamation of unity with Indonesia of November 30, 1975; the petition of integration of May 31, 1976 by the House of Representatives and the consultation by the Indonesian delegation in June 1976 of the local chiefs and councils as happened in India, Pakistan, Serawak, Sabah and many other former colonies and the participation in two Indonesian general elections in 1982 and 1987 (90% voted), were, taken together, to be considered as sufficient execution of the right of self-determination. Many countries including all in the region (except Vietnam) Australia, U.S, Canada, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea say yes. Many others, mostly communist countries, say no. The international community however seems to be losing interest and accepting more and more the situation as it is.

5. The freedom of religion of the Panca Sila gives the church an enormous opportunity to take care of the spiritual and where necessary educational and material needs of the people.

6. As far as the human rights is concerned there is sufficient evidence that human rights have been violated, first by Fretilin, and then by others, as unfortunately happens in any civil war. One of the most appalling cases was that of the police commander Major Magiolo de Gouveia, who went as a parley to Fretilin commandant Rogerio Labato, was put under detention., After torture he was executed with more than 1000 other prisoners. Together they fell into an already dug mass-grave, which has been found later. Today there is no clear evidence of human rights still being violated, but if there are, the International Red Cross has sufficient possibilities to react properly.

7. Unity with Indonesia brought in 12 years uncontestedly more wellfare, education, health and food than in the previous centuries, but a lot is still to be done to reach the level of the other parts of Indonesia.

8. Portugal heritage is still seen in historical and languistical regard.

Recommendations

1. The broken diplomatic relations between Portugal and Indonesia should be reestablished in a way acceptable to both parties.

2. After that, through normal diplomatic negotiations Portugal and Indonesia should try to reach an understanding in which on one side the actual situation should be accepted and on the other side Portugal's historical role and special relationship with East Timor should be recognised. The possibility of a Portuguese consulate in Dili should be considered.

3. One should try to find an acceptable solution for Fretilin adherents within and without East Timor, in which they would have the opportunity to participate in the development of East Timor on the basis of the existing general amnesty, of live in exile in Portugal or any other country that wants to have them.

4. In the meantime, international bodies should abstain from statements which are offensive for one or both of the parties concerned. There is basically no obstacle for a warm and friendly relationship between the peoples of Indonesia and Portugal which have for centuries close relationship.

5. European countries, related to Portugal through NATO and EEC, should do everything in their power to facilitate this process of reconciliation and refrain from irritating interferences. Ten of the twelve EEC countries fortunately abstained in 1982 with only Portugal and Greece (Turkey) voting against Indonesia.

6. Portuguese members of the European Parliament should accept the possibility to visit East Timor, in which their free movement and free contacts should be guaranteed.

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